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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The study of agricultural commodity supply and crop acreage response 
has traditionally occupied an important role in agricultural economics 
analysis- From the research perspectives supply response analysis has had 
applications to areas ranging from the study of farmers5 response to risk 
and uncertainty to the development of spatial equilibrium models and the 
specification and estimation of large-scale econometric forecasting 
models- From the point of view of policy analysis, the results of supply 
analysis have proved important in helping determine the international trade 
impacts of changes in commodity policy and in estimating the effects on 
U .S- producers of changes in domestic farm programs.
This last area, the investigation of impacts of government agricul­
tural commodity programs, has received particular attention in recent years 
for a variety of reasons- First, the programs themselves have been 
directed at some of the major agricultural commodities produced in the 
U.S. (corn, wheat, cotton, etc.) with far-reaching implications for inter­
national commodity markets, U.S. foreign economic policy, and other areas. 
Second, most of the commodity programs have been voluntary rather than man­
datory in nature, with producers electing to participate or not participate 
with programs operative in any specific year. Thus, in some years, these 
programs have had relatively minor impacts on aggregate commodity supplies, 
while in other years, these effects have been substantial; in either case, 
these effects have been uncertain, a priori. Third, because the provisions 
of farm programs have continually changed over time, it has been difficult 
to construct meaningful economic models which have applicability over the 
long run. Finally, like many other government programs, farm commodity 
programs have important political implications with associated welfare 
considerations, differential geographic effects, and major impacts on the 
basic structure of agriculture.
This paper examines the impacts of government feed grain programs on 
corn and soybean acreage response in the post-World War II period. The 
aggregate acreage supply decisions of producers in four Corn Belt states 
(Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio) are analyzed under two regimes: a
"free market" regime composed of years in which producers responded to 
primarily market-based factors in formulating their acreage allocation 
decisions, and a "farm program" regime in which participating producers 
received various program benefits but had to idle land and abide by plant­
ing restrictions to receive those benefits. This disaggregated approach 
permits explicit attention to be given to the role that farm programs have 
played in causing structural change in crop response functions in the post­
war era.
In addition, the approach taken here extends previous research in a 
number of ways. First, a simple theoretic framework based on expected 
profit maximization is developed which focuses attention on the often- 
overlooked but fundamental decision faced by grain producers in many years, 
whether or not to participate in voluntary feed grain programs. The
1
2discussion emphasizes the extent to which the degree of aggregate program 
participation has important implications for the construction and interpre­
tation of supply response models-
Second, the disaggregated nature of the econometric model estimated 
permits attention to be given to statistical testing of the hypothesis of 
supply elasticity stability over time and regime changes. Accounting for 
the likelihood of structural change in supply relationships enables the 
piecing together of some apparently disparate results in the previous 
literature.
Third, inclusion of both corn and soybean crops in the model developed 
and estimated permits recognition of the importance of the multiple crop 
(and often unintended) effects of farm programs * This phenomenon is 
particularly important in the Corn Belt states given the dominance of corn 
and soybean crops. Multiple crop approaches to the crop acreage response 
question have only infrequently been developed (see Walker and Penn and, 
more recently, McKlnzie, Binkley, and Gardiner's discussion of a "systemic" 
approach).
Finally, both autocorrelation in individual supply equations and 
contemporaneous correlation across error terms in sets of supply equations 
are often encountered in empirical analysis. However, previous models have 
only infrequently corrected for either of these econometric problems. This 
analysis uses Parks' three-stage Aitken procedure to correct for both types 
of error term correlation in a multiple equation system. Use of the Parks' 
procedure yields coefficient (elasticity) estimates which are more 
efficient than would otherwise be obtainable.
The organization of the paper is as follows : Chapter II outlines
historical developments in U.S. and Corn Belt crop acreage and production, 
post-War government feed grain programs, and the previous literature on 
acreage supply response. The third Chapter develops the microeconomic 
foundations and aggregative theoretic model underlying the estimated econo­
metric model. Chapter Four describes the econometric model, the Parks 
estimation procedure, and the data used in the analysis. Particular atten­
tion is given to an alternative method of incorporating program-related 
provisions in an econometric model of supply response. Chapter Five 
discusses the parameter stability tests performed and presents the econo­
metric results. The discussion emphasizes the importance of temporal and 
regime changes in supply elasticities and the multiple crop effects of 
feed grain programs. The final chapter summarizes the results and suggests 
extensions for further work. The emphasis throughout the paper is on the 
analysis of structural changes in acreage response relationships that have 
been caused by farm programs over the post-War era.
3CHAPTER II
PRODUCTION TRENDS, FARM PROGRAMS, AND PREVIOUS APPROACHES 
TO COMMODITY SUPPLY RESPONSE ANALYSIS
This chapter provides the background for the development of the 
acreage response model presented later in this study• Three areas are 
reviewed here: (i) trends in U.S. and Midwestern crop production and
acreage allocation over the period 1948-1980; (ii) major post-War govern­
ment feed grain programs and their implications fox acreage supply; and 
(ill) the previous economic literature which has investigated the effects 
of farm programs on acreage supply response*.
Trends in Crop Production and Planted Acreage
The post-World War II era has witnessed a number of major transforma­
tions in U.S. agriculture (Cochrane, Schertz). Among these changes have 
been enormous production increases in feed and food grain crops as the 
U.S. has assumed an increasingly dominant position in the world grain 
trade. As can be seen in Table 1, these production increases have been 
most impressive for corn, soybeans, and wheat• U.S. corn production 
increased from 3.31 billion bushels in 1948 to 7.76 billion bushels in 
1979, an increase of 134 percent. Production increases for soybeans were 
even more spectacular, increasing tenfold from 227 million bushels in 1948 
to 2.27 billion bushels in 1979. Except for wheat, which has also recorded 
large production increases in the past three decades, the production of 
most other grains has increased to a lesser extent or, in some cases (oats, 
in particular), even diminished.
Examination of Table 1 also reveals the fact that the expansion in 
production has been the result of different factors for different crops. 
Yield increases between 1948 and 1979 of over 154 percent for corn more 
than offset a decrease in harvested acreage of 7.6 percent. For wheat the 
story was somewhat similar, with a large 90 percent yield increase off­
setting a substantial 14.3 percent decrease in harvested acreage. For soy­
beans, the situation was considerably different with a sevenfold increase 
in harvested acreage reinforcing a 50 percent increase in average yields. 
Overall, total crop acreage increased by a modest 6.4 percent between 1948 
and 1979, nationally, although this national figure masks considerable 
regional variation in planted acreage trends. In sum, the large post-War 
expansion in grain production has been largely a story of: (i) substantial 
increases in yield for corn, wheat, and to a lesser extent, soybeans; (ii) 
a massive movement out of alternative crops into soybeans; and (ill) rela­
tive stability in the overall amount of land resources devoted to crop 
production. The forces underlying these developments have been many, 
including increased specialization of production on individual farms, rapid 
technological change, and large increases in farm usage of non-labor 
capital-intensive inputs (Rosine and Helmberger).
In the area of prime interest in this study, the U.S. Corn Belt, and 
specifically the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio, the above 
trends have proven especially important« Because of a favorable climate, a
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5well-developed transportation system, and a flat, relatively homogeneous 
topography, the Corn Belt area has maintained a comparative advantage in 
grain production, particularly in corn and soybeans® Table 2 demonstrates 
the extent to which the four-state area has developed and maintained a 
significant share of total U.S. production of these two crops® Although 
individual state shares of national production have shifted over time, the 
region as a whole has accounted for over 50 percent of national corn and 
soybean production for at least the past two decades® Table 2 does not 
reveal a closely related development: the production of oats in the four
state area decreased from 514®5 million bushels in 1950 to 101.3 million 
bushels in 1980. In terms of the region*s national share of production, 
the decline was from 36.5 percent to 22.1 percent.
While yield increases have proved as important in the Corn Belt as 
nationally in causing grain production increases, the increases in land 
resources devoted to corn and soybean production have been, to an even 
greater extent than nationally, the result of shifts from other crops into 
corn and soybeans rather than the opening up of new crop acreage. As 
demonstrated in Figure 1 and in Appendix Table A.l, the expansion in total 
crop acreage in the four-state region was relatively modest over the post­
war period, increasing from 62.1 million acres in 1948 to 73.8 million 
acres in 1979, or approximately .5 percent annually* At the same time, 
however, the proportion of this slowly growing land base devoted to the 
production of corn and soybeans (or idled under feed grain programs) has 
steadily increased to a 1980 figure of 82.4 percent. Accompanying this 
trend have been offsetting decreases in acreages planted to oats, rye, 
barley, and sorghum grain (except in Illinois)• Increasingly, then, the 
Midwestern grain producer *s decision has become one of the allocation of a 
relatively fixed acreage base among competing crops, in particular corn 
versus soybeans.
One of the short-run trends revealed in Figure 1 is the highly vari­
able proportion of cropland idled under government feed grain programs. In 
many years, idled acreage represented an alternative "crop", with returns 
to idled, diverted, or set-aside acreage coming from the series of feed 
grain programs which have existed over the post-War era. Though dis­
continuous in nature and possessing continually changing incentives and 
constraints, in many years, feed grain programs provided a dominant 
influence in determining aggregate planted acreage and production levels.
To understand the role that these programs have had in influencing acreage 
allocation among competing crops (including idled land), it Is necessary to 
review briefly the evolution of post-War government feed grain programs.
Government Farm Programs: 1948-1980 .
The evolution of U.S. farm programs in the post-War era has been 
detailed elsewhere (Brandow; Cochrane and Ryan) and thus a lengthy review 
of these programs is unnecessary here. It is important, however, to out 
line the major changes In post-War feed grain programs which have had such 
a strong impact on trends in corn and, indirectly, soybean production. 
Underlying these trends, of course, is the changing environment these pro­
grams have created for producer decision-making.
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The Free Market Regime
Examination of government feed grain programs over the post-War period 
reveals the existence of two major types of programs, each discontinuous in 
nature. On the one hand are programs that offered producers various types 
of benefits, principally price support loans on production, but which 
required no concomitant limitations on feed grain production. On the other 
hand are the programs which offered participating producers added benefits 
(diversion payments, set-aside payments, deficiency payments, etc.), but 
which also required production cutbacks in the form of acreage allotments, 
diversion and set-aside requirements, etc.
The first set of years in which no production controls were required 
of producers we refer to as the "free market" regime in this study. These 
years were 1948-49, 1951-53, 1959-60, 1974-77, and 1980. Although price 
support loans were available to producers in these years, in many cases, 
loan rates were less than or only slightly greater than market prices.
Some additional farm program benefits (Soil Bank payments, disaster pay­
ments , etc.) were available to producers in several of these years, but not 
on a consistent basis nor on the scale provided by the feed grain programs 
in other years. During this period, then, Midwestern feed grain and 
soybean producers generally reacted to competitive market-oriented factors 
in formulating their resource allocation decisions.
The Farm Program Regime
The majority of years in the 1948-1980 period, were characterized by 
government feed grain programs which provided producers with sets of incen­
tives and constraints in attempting to control grain production and simul­
taneously enhance producers' incomes. These programs and the years in 
which they were relevant were: the acreage allotment and Soil Bank pro­
grams , 1950 and 1954-58; the acreage diversion programs, 1961-70; and the 
set-aside programs, 1971-73 and 1978-79. The main provisions of these 
programs and the crops to which they applied are outlined in Table 3.
Acreage Allotment and Soil Bank Programs: 1950, 1954-58
The acreage allotment program of the 1950’s offered participating corn 
producers guaranteed price support loans on production in return for their 
abiding by allotments or limitations on corn plantings, generally defined 
by specified proportions of previously planted acreage. Unlike later pro­
grams which were national in scope, the acreage allotment programs applied 
only to the major c o m  producing areas of the U.S., the boundaries of which 
were revised annually: the Corn Belt states, eastern Plains states,
southern Lake states, and coastal regions of the mid-Atlantic states.
The corn allotment program was initially moderately successful in 
cutting back corn supplies, but a number of developments limited the pro­
gram ’s success in its later years. Participation rates were generally low, 
reaching a maximum of 41 percent of eligible acreage in 1955, and declining 
substantially after that, due partially to the introduction in 1956 of a 
second tier price support loan for those who did not comply with acreage 
allotments. In addition, allotments "chased'' acreage from corn and wheat
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into the production of other crops, partially diminishing their intended 
effects* For these and other reasons, the corn allotment program was dis­
continued after 1958.
The Soil Bank program was introduced in 1956 and exerted a modest 
temporary impact on planted crop acreage in the U. S. in the late 1950's 
and, to a lesser extent, the early 1960's. Intended as an additional 
method of lowering the then rapidly expanding output of crop producers, the 
Soil Bank program had two main features, an Acreage Reserve program which 
existed on an annual basis only through 1958, and a long-term Conservation 
Reserve program, which extended (due to the existence of long-term con­
tracts signed in the 1950's) through 1973* The Acreage Reserve program was 
designed to limit the acreage planted to allotment crops (corn, wheat, 
cotton, etc.) by offering income-compensating payments to producers of 
these crops for their planting reductions. The Conservation Reserve pro­
gram offered payments for foregone production to producers as a means to 
divert marginal land from crop production to conservation uses on a longer- 
term basis. The Soil Bank program was discontinued in 1959, although the 
last Conservation Reserve contracts did not expire until the early 1970's.
The acreage allotment and Soil Bank programs were considerably differ­
ent from the programs which followed in the 1960's and 1970 *s. The allot­
ment program offered more limited benefits, imposed stricter constraints, 
was more limited geographically in scope, and in general represented a 
fundamentally different approach to acreage control than did succeeding 
programs. For these reasons, the six years in which the acreage allotment 
program was in effect are excluded from the present analysis.
Acreage Diversion Programs: 1961-1970
The acreage diversion programs of the 1960's marked the first step in 
increasing flexibility in government feed grain programs from the restric­
tive allotment programs. Like the allotment programs, they were voluntary 
in nature, but offered feed grain producers greater financial incentives 
for idling land previously devoted to grain production.
As can be seen in Table 3, four types of incentives were offered 
participating producers under the acreage diversion programs in various 
years: (!) price support loans (1961-1970); (ii) payments for required
acreage diversion (1961-1965); (iii) payments for voluntary diversion 
(1961-70 except for 1967); and (iv) price support payments (1963-70).
Price support loans were offered in each year to participants on "normal 
production",*■ subject to the required idled acreage constraint of 20 per­
cent of historic base acreage. During the first five years of the diver­
sion programs, 1961-65, additional payments for these minimum diversion 
requirements were also made to producers, to further induce their compli­
ance by partially compensating them for their income foregone by their 
idling land. In all years but 1967, participating producers could divert 
additional cropland, up to a maximum proportion of base acreage, and
Normal production" from crop "base acreage," in turn defined by the 
previous years* plantings, minus acres devoted to conserving uses, minus 
land idled under the feed grain programs.
areceive "voluntary diversion payments"® Finally, beginning in 1963, price 
support loan rates were lowered substantially, and a "price support pay­
ment" became available to producers, paid on normal production on acreage 
actually grown® In 1966 and thereafter, payments for required diversion 
were terminated, and the price support payment was paid on the smaller of 
planted acreage or 50 percent of base acreage®
The principal constraints on participating producers were the required 
diversion level of 20 percent of base acreage, the maximum diversion level 
of 40 percent (1961-63) or 50 percent (1964-66, 1968-70) of base acreage, 
and after 1966, the limitations on price support payments® An additional 
constraint was eliminated in 1965 when the "substitution" provisions were 
introduced, enabling producers of feed grains or wheat to substitute the 
production of one crop for another without losing program eligibility or 
benefits® Though important in some areas (e.g. the Plains states), the 
substitution provisions did not prove particularly important in Corn Belt 
states where winter wheat has been a crop of generally only minor 
importance®
The average diversion programs of the 19605s represented a partial 
step from the constraining allotment programs of the 19501s to the even 
more flexible set—aside programs of the 19701s® Not surprisingly then, 
feed grain program participation rates (defined by the ratio of participat­
ing to eligible crop base acreage) were considerably higher than during the 
1950fs , generally running between 55 and 65 percent nationwide. The set- 
aside programs, though, proved even more popular®
Acreage Set-Aside Programs: 1971-73, 1978-79
The acreage set-aside programs of the 1970es represented the final 
step in the trend toward allowing for greater decision-making flexibility 
by participating feed grain producers under the general constraints imposed 
by government commodity programs. The major constraint imposed by these 
programs was that to receive program benefits, feed grain (and wheat) pro­
ducers were required to set-aside a specified proportion of their total 
crop acreage to conserving uses. Unlike previous programs which required 
limitations on acreage planted to specific crops, once the initial set 
aside acreage was idled, producers were then free to plant any combination 
of feed grains, wheat, soybeans, or other crops they desired®
The set-aside programs changed substantially over the 1970*s, but the 
program may be broken down into two phases, one existing in 1971-73 and the 
second operative in 1978-79. The 1971-73 program required minimum set- 
asides of overall crop acreage (20 percent in 1971; 25 percent in 1972; 10 
percent (under one option) in 1973), but allowed for substantial flexibil­
ity in planting decisions once this constraint had been met. Two primary 
types of benefits accrued to cooperating producers: price support loans
(though at low levels), and set-aside payments, based on 50 percent of base 
acreage of program crops. Set-aside payments were calculated by the pro­
duct of 50 percent of crop base acreage, times historic (or later, "pro­
gram") crop yield, times a per bushel payment rate determined by the 
difference between a guaranteed payment rate and the October—February 
average market price. A preliminary set-aside payment was made to
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producers early In the planting season based on an estimate of the final 
price differential* Only in 1972 were additional voluntary diversion 
payments (for diversion up to an additional 20 percent of corn base 
acreage) available to participating producers*
As a result primarily of the increased flexibility in planting deci­
sions allowed under the set-aside programs, feed grain program participa­
tion rates increased markedly over previous levels. The proportion of feed 
grain base acreage on participating farms to total eligible base acreage in 
the U.S. increased from 66 percent in 1970, the final acreage diversion 
program year, to 88 percent in 1973, the highest historical level of feed 
grain program participation*
A number of changes characterized the 1978-79 set-aside programs 
following passage of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977. First, required 
set-asides were made proportionate to current rather than historic planting 
levels. Second, a "normal crop acreage" (NCA) was defined for each farm, 
based on total 1977 plantings of designated crops, and program benefits 
were only available to producers whose planted plus required idled acreage 
was no larger than their NCA* Third, paid voluntary diversion was again 
made optional for program participants, if the total of their planted 
acreage, required set-asides, and voluntary diversions did not exceed their 
NCA* Finally, while price support loans were available to producers as 
before, the principal program benefit was redefined in the form of 
"deficiency payments" based on target prices guaranteed to producers. 
Deficiency payments (DP) for corn were calculated as follows:
DP - [Pct - max (Pc®, Pcs)][Yc][acp][a]
where: P.t - corn target price,
Pcm = corn market price,
Pcs - corn loan rate,
Yc * corn program yield,
aCp = planted corn acreage,
and a - "allocation factor", where .8 £  a 1.0.
The maximum benefit (a = 1.0) was available only if the producer reduced 
his corn acreage to a specific proportion below the previous year’s plant­
ings. ^ Generally, then, returns to producers under the program were 
greater the higher the target price, the lower the market price or loan 
rate, and the greater the product of c o m  plantings relative to the size of 
the allocation factor. Other program benefits were made available in the 
form of disaster payments, participation in the grain reserve, etc. High 
market prices relative to program benefits held participation rates and
2These planted acreage limitations for corn were 95 percent of 1977 plant­
ings In 1978, and 90 percent of 1978 "considered" plantings in 1979.
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total acreage diversions in the 1978-79 feed grain programs to rather low 
levels (see Figure 1)*
The foregoing review of post-War government feed grain programs sets 
the stage for the subsequent incorporation of specific program provisions 
into an econometric supply response model (see Chapter XV). In addition, 
it permits several important conclusions regarding the historic direction 
of E e  programs. Th... trends included: a gradual lessening of specific
crop planting constraints in favor of greater flexibility in planting 
choices; an increasing integration of commodity program pricing pollute 
into the larger world market; a gradual increase in rates of program par 
ticlpation8accompanying the increased program flexibility; and an increas­
ing reliance on providing participation incentives rather than imposing 
constraints in attempting to control feed grain supplies.
isI
Literature Review
The problems involved in modeling the response of crop acreage and 
agricultural supply to changes in output prices and other variables have
concerned researchers for decades* Several different of H956
have been pursued. First* following the seminal work of Nerlove 
1958) and his development of the adaptive expectations too » .
able body of literature has been concerned with empirical verification* 
modification* and critiques of the Nerlovian model (Askari and Cummings).
In the area of acreage response analysis* studies using adaptive expecta- 
tions approaches have included analyses of U.B. (Lid-an and Bawden and 
Canadian (Schmitz) wheat supply, and Robinson and Hoover a study of corn
nsa r r s L i o f ^ ^ ^  - .supply estimation (Sharpies; Tomek and Robinson), the recursive programming 
models developed by Henderson and Day, and, more recently, multi 
aDDroaches baeed on constant elasticity of transformation (CET) production
functions (Green; Shumway and Chang). A third of ^related^variablesyears, begun to address the important role played by risk-related variables
in agricultural supply response (Just; Traill; Burnstein).
The supply analysis literature which is particularly relevant to this 
study is that which has focused on the incorporation and analysis of th 
impacts of government farm programs on agricultural commodity supply. 
Because tLfe programs have been highly variable and discontinuous m  
nature, but at thi sane time have had important short-run impacts on crop 
acreage the problems posed for economic analysis have been substantial. 
Yet the dynamic policy environment surrounding farm programs has continued 
to stimulate research in this area.
Without doubt, the most common approach to the integration of govern­
ment program parameters in acreage response models has been the use of
"effective" price support and diversion payment
variables in econometric time-series supply models. " « * " * ’*  
and Subotnik in their 1969 analysis of soybean acreage supply, i
by Houck and Ryan in an analysis of corn acreage response under government
FIGURE 2. EFFECTIVE  SUPPORT PRICE
ACRES
PLANTED
Source : Houck, et a!. (1976)
farm programs, the construction of "effective'* price and payment variables 
is based on the argument that the constraints imposed by production control 
programs on planted crop acreage make program benefits available to the 
producer on only a portion of total acreage*
In Figure 2, for example, an announced support rate of Pa , with no 
accompanying acreage restrictions, would be assumed to induce the planting 
of acres* However, imposition of a planting constraint, A2 » drives the 
"effective" level of Pa to Pf, where Pf - r . Pa , 0 <_ r 1.0. The result
is an effective shift in the supply curve from to S2 - Parameter r is an
"adjustment factor" where:
r 1/2
^min
Abase
4. i^nax
^base
that is, r equals the average of the minimum and maximum proportions of 
base acreage that could be planted under the program* Clearly, if no 
voluntary acreage diversion is permitted, as in 1967, r = 1.0, and Pj «
Pa * The suggested method (Houck, et al.) for determining "effective diver­
sion payment" levels (DPf), where DPf ~ w . DPa, DPa equals the announced 
diversion payment, and 0 < w £  1.0, is analogous * Given estimates of r and 
w and exogenous announced support price and diversion payment levels, the 
major program parameters can be integrated fairly simply as Independent 
variables in econometric models which attempt to explain endogenous acreage 
response.
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Since its introduction, the "effective" price and payment concept has 
been used extensively in the specification of crop supply response under 
government farm programs. Houck and Subotnik and, later, Kenyon and Evans, 
applied the concept to soybean supply response. Houck and Ryan, an ya 
and Abel (1973a, 1973b) analyzed feed grain supply response to effective 
support prices and diversion payments. Applications to several crops were 
made by Houck, et al., Walker and Penn, and, most recently, McKinzie, 
Binkley, and Gardiner. Moe and Whittaker, and Wilson, Arthur, and 
Whittaker utilized the concept in studying the role of risk in the produc 
tion of wheat in the Northwest. This widespread use of the effective price 
concept has been due to, first, the ability to include a number of program 
parameters in a single explanatory variable in a regression equation and 
second, the commonly desirable statistical properties (high R , significant 
coefficient estimates) of models subsequently estimated.
Despite these apparent advantages, however, a number of serious prob­
lems characterize the construction and use of "effective" price and payment 
variables. First, though amenable for use in aggregate economic analysis, 
the meaning of these variables for actual farmer decision-making is uncer­
tain. The effective price and payment variables are constructed on the 
basis of average participation rates, while individual farmers either do or 
do not participate based on market price expectations, announced program 
benefits and constraints, and other factors.
A second problem is that it is difficult to form a priori expectations 
regarding the direction of changes in acreage response due to changes in 
expected price and payment variables. For example, an Increase in the 
effective support rate is generally assumed to have a positive effect 
Planted crop acreage. However, from an alternative perspective, an 
increase in effective support prices would be expected to make program 
participation more profitable, thereby increasing the participation rate 
and decreasing aggregate crop acreage. Thus, there is considerable uncer­
tainty regarding the expected effects of changes in effective price and 
payment variables, a priori«
Third, use of effective price and payment variables obscures the feet 
that it is not the absolute levels of these variables, but rather their 
magnitudes relative to market prices that induces participation in feed^ 
grain programs and thus influences aggregate crop acreage* Unfortunately 
this problem is not solved if market price variables are included as sepa­
rate regressors in regression equations because, as pointed out by 
Burnstein, their simultaneous use creates confusion as to which is the 
relevant price variable determining crop acreage*
Despite these and other problems, the effective price approach has 
dominated the literature in recent years. Other approaches have been taken 
however. Penn and Irwin used simple price supports along with lagged 
market prices in a simultaneous equation model of c r o p  production in t e 
Delta states, Lidman and Bawden, and later Garst and Miller, in st d 
examining U.S. wheat acreage response, used variables explicitly measuring 
program benefits and constraints (acreage allotments, set-asides, etc.). 
Other studies have included lagged endogenous acreage variables under the 
partial adjustment hypothesis (Penn and Irwin; Gardner; etc.). Finally,
16
number of the above (and other) studies have included current year acreages 
planted to other crops as explanatory variables in single equation supply 
models. If one accepts the proposition, however, that acreage allocation 
decisions for spring-planted crops are made simultaneously rather than 
recursively, then the inclusion of such variables as regressors in econo­
metric supply models is inappropriate, since the resulting ordinary least 
squares coefficient estimates are inconsistent.
A recent approach to acreage supply response analysis has been the 
disaggregated approach initially taken by Morzuch, Weaver, and Helmberger, 
in a study of wheat acreage response. This approach uses data that is dis­
aggregated geographically by state and temporally by the existence or non­
existence of government farm programs in specific years. The advantages of 
this approach are, (i) that years in which market forces dominated crop 
production are not combined with years in which government farm programs 
exerted strong influences on acreage allocation decisions, and (ii) that 
estimated supply elasticities are not constrained to being equal across 
different regions and years. The primary disadvantage of this approach is 
the resulting lack of time series observations in econometric models which 
begin with disaggregated temporal data. This, however, is the basic 
approach that is followed in this analysis.
The abovementioned and other acreage response studies have yielded 
widely varying estimates of acreage supply response elasticities for corn 
and soybeans, the two crops of prime interest in this study. Table 4 
summarizes some of these results. The use of three different proxies for 
farmers1 expected prices renders these estimates, in a strict sense, 
incomparable. However, the high degree of correlation among the different 
measures (Houck and Ryan; Kenyon and Evans) means that some generalizations 
are possible.
With regard to corn acreage response, short-run own-price elasticities 
of supply range from a puzzling -.20 (Reed and Riggins) to a high of .44 
(Weaver and Krainick)* For those studies which have used the effective 
price approach, supply elasticity estimates are much closer in magnitude, 
generally in the .13 to .23 range. While the different price measures, 
geographic areas, and time periods used no doubt account for much of this 
variation, the range of estimates is uncomfortably wide. Given this degree 
of variation, the results of highly aggregative studies would appear to be 
of questionable relevance to specific geographic areas or for specific time 
periods.
For soybeans, the short-run supply elasticity estimates are even more 
variable. Depending on the area, time period, and price measure used, 
estimates range from a low of .16 (Heady and Rao) to a high of .84 (Houck 
and Subotnik). As for corn, the high degree of variation in these esti­
mates makes generalizations from aggregative studies to specific regions 
and time periods problematical. Nevertheless, soybean own-price elastici­
ties do appear uniformly higher than those for corn over the post-War 
period.
Table 4 also provides some estimates of long run and cross-price 
elasticities for the two crops. As expected under the Nerlovian adaptive
17
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expectations framework, long-run estimates are uniformly greater than 
short-run estimates for both crops« Examination of cross—price elasticity 
estimates reveals that soybean acreage appears much more sensitive to 
changes in corn prices than vice versa* This result is confirmed in this 
analysis as well* A hypothesis that might explain these findings is that 
variations in c o m  acreage appeared highly dependent on the existence and 
changing provisions of feed grain programs relative to variations in 
soybean prices * Conversely, for soybeans, variations in corn prices as 
well as the cross-commodity effects of the feed grain programs appear to 
have been important determinants of acreage response. These questions are 
dealt with in depth in following chapters.
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CHAPTER III
THE THEORY OF FARM PROGRAM PARTICIPATION
Although the rate at which farmers participate in voluntary farm pro- 
grams has important implications for aggregate supply responsiveness for 
the relevant crops, the producer*s participation decision has received 
little attention in previous research. In this chapter, the basic feed 
grain program participation decision for a representative farmer is dis­
cussed and, using some simple results from duality theory, a model of the 
participation decision is proposed. The decision of whether or not to 
participate in a representative corn program is considered first. Implica­
tions for aggregate corn acreage supply response are then presented. 
Finally, attention is directed to the implications of feed grain program 
participation for soybean production in a production system where c o m  and 
soybeans are the major crop alternatives.
Feed Grain Program Participation
Consider a voluntary feed grain (corn) program in which participating 
producers are required to limit corn acreage to no greater than a specified 
proportion of historic base acreage in return for a guaranteed payment from 
the government. The remaining idled or set-aside acreage is assumed to 
equal a specified percentage of the overall base acreage, and the sum of 
the set-aside acreage and planted acreage limitation (allotment) equals 
total base acreage. The guaranteed program payment is assumed to equal the 
product of an announced per bushel payment rate, established yield, and a 
designated proportion of feed grain base acreage. These features approxi­
mate those which have characterized actual feed grain programs since 1961, 
and could be reformulated to reflect specific program changes (price sup­
port payments, deficiency payments, etc•) since that time• For the present 
purposes, though, these general features will suffice.
Consider next a crop producer who must allocate his land among compet­
ing crops and must decide whether or not to participate in the voluntary 
program. Given the dominant role of corn and soybean crops in the Corn 
Belt region, the region of specific interest here, it is assumed that the 
producer must plant either corn or soybeans, or if he elects to participate 
in an acreage reduction program, he may idle crop acreage.
It is useful to consider the producer’s objective function under the 
above alternatives as one of maximizing expected profit given both exo­
genously determined factors (both market and program-related) and his 
expectations of other random variables (e.g. output prices). In fact, the 
expected profit function for the individual producer expresses maximized 
expected profit as a function of all exogenous parameters and constraints 
in the system (Silberberg). In those "free market" years when acreage 
reduction programs are not optional or in "farm program" years in which the 
producer elects nonparticipation, the producer’s expected profit function 
may be represented as a function of only market-related parameters and
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constraints. In this case, the producer's expected profit (x*) is defined 
ass
( 1 )  * *  -  P c q c *  +  P s q s ^  -  w . x  -  I F C
or, in general functional form,
(2) ^ ^ ( P c9 Pgs w, Z)
where Pc is the expected price of corn; Pg is the expected price of soy­
beans ; qc* and qs* are, respectively, the expected quantities of corn and 
soybean produced (where each is the product of planted acreage and expected 
yield); w is a vector of variable input prices (labor, fuel, fertilizer, 
etc.); x~~is the associated vector of variable inputs employed; and Z is a 
vector of fixed inputs (total land available (aT), machinery, etc.) with an 
associated total fixed cost, TFC. Note that the form of equation (1) 
assumes statistical independence between crop prices and yields, a reason­
able assumption at the level of the individual producer (Dillon).
If, in years in which a voluntary feed grain program Is in effect, 
the producer elects to participate, his maximized expected profit can be 
represented by an alternative expected profit function, x*:
(3) x ’ - x' (Pc& Pg, w, _Z, B, acb> a)
where B is the per acre direct payment (diversion, set-aside, or deficiency 
payment; acb is the established feed grain base; a equals the proportion of 
base acres that a program participant must idle; and all other variables 
are defined as before. The participating producer is assumed to maximize 
expected profit, x*, given the incentives and constraints defined by the 
provisions of the program.
Figure 3 gives a graphical representation of the relevant expected 
profit functions for the nonparticipation and participation options under 
the voluntary program, assuming all variables except for Pc remain con­
stant, Consider first the nonparticipant's expected profit function 
x*(Pc)* If Pc < Pco, the producer plants only soybeans, and expected 
profit is constant at xQ for different Pc - However, for Pc > Pc0 with all 
choice variables held constant, maximized expected profit would increase 
linearly with increases in Pc. If choice variables were allowed to assume 
their optimal values, the level of expected profit for any Pc would be even 
greater (Silberberg, p. 266), Under these circumstances, the usual proper­
ties of x*(Pc) hold; e.g., x* is convex, nondecreasing, continuous, and 
homogeneous of degree one in Pc (Varian, p» 30),
Furthermore, using Hotelling's lemma, the supply function for corn, 
qc*, can be derived from the expected profit function, x*:
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FIGURE 3 EXPECTED PROFIT FUNCTIONS WITH AND
WITHOUT PARTICIPATION IN THE FEED 
GRAIN PROGRAM
(4) dit*apc* qc* (T c> w, 2)
At any given level of production, qc* is assumed to be the product of 
harvested acreage and expected yield, Yc*. Since Yc* is, by definition, 
stochastic and price insensitive, the mapping of the corn acreage supply 
function, ac(Pc, Ps , w, Z) with respect to Pc will be identical to the 
qc*(Pc) function, differentiated only by a constant representing expected 
yield. This then establishes the relationship between the producer’s 
expected profit function and the corn acreage supply function.
Now consider the nature of the expected profit function for a producer 
participating in the feed grain program who is required to set-aside a 
proportion of his cropland base* For the moment, abstract away from pro­
gram benefits received. Due to the decreased cropland resources at his 
disposal, the producer's expected profit function shifts down to (Pc). 
From the envelope theorem, xn* must be less steeply inclined than x* for 
any level of Pc, and may never rise above x*. Assume that Kn ' is, in fact, 
everywhere below n*, given the viability of soybeans as a cropping alterna-
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tive. As Pc rises above Pc0 and approaches Pca, the profit-maximizing 
participating producer plants more acreage to corn* with a specified level 
of crop acreage set aside# Ultimately, however, at Pc — Pca* producer
plants as much c o m  as is allowed under the feed grain program# For Pc > 
Pca, the producer may not Increase corn acreage, thus expected profit 
Increases linearly along te'0(PC) with further increases in Pc* Again, 
given the envelope theorem, u 10 will lie everywhere below 1 beyond the 
point of tangency at Pc = Pca#
The participating producer has thusfar been assumed to have set aside 
cropland, but no offsetting program benefits have yet been specified. 
Clearly, under the scenario described above, no incentive to participate in 
a voluntary feed grain program would exist, given that the expected profit 
function for the participant lies everywhere below that for the nonpartici­
pation option. However, if a per acre set-aside payment is paid to 
participating producers, the participant ’s expected profit function is 
shifted up fromi0 '(Pc) to x !(Pc)’ Given the set-aside and payment provi­
sions, the decision to participate becomes a function of the level of Pc»
At Pc < Pci, corn market prices are relatively low, and the expected profit 
maximizing producer elects program participation ( te 1(Pq ))• However, for 
higher corn price levels, Pc > Pci, expected profit is maximized through 
nonparticipation. Price levels Pc^ and Pca, we will subsequently refer to 
as the indifference price and the allotment price, respectively. Whether 
or not the eligible producer voluntary elects to participate in the feed 
grain program will depend on the value of Pc relative to Pc^» as well as 
the magnitudes of the program parameters (B, ac ,^ and a )•
Given the above formulation, the corn acreage supply function for the 
representative producer depends fundamentally on the relationship between 
Pca and Pci. Figure 4 demonstrates the corn supply function for the case 
described above, where Pca > Pci* The second quadrant of Figure 4 gives 
the expected profit functions for the participating and non-participating 
options, as expressed above in Figure 3- In the first quadrant, a equals 
total farm acreage, ac^ equals corn base acreage, aca is the corn acreage 
allotment, Sc is the corn acreage supply curve assuming program non­
participation, and Lc is the supply function assuming participation and an 
acreage allotment at aca. Supply curves Sc and Lc are derived, in the 
manner described above, from the first derivatives of and te’ with 
respect to Pc . The second partial derivatives give the curvature proper­
ties of Sc and Lc. Note that the perfectly inelastic portion of Lc above 
Pc ■ Pca is due to the linearity of te1 (Pc) above Pca.
The participant’s supply curve Lc lies to the left of Sa because of 
the set-aside acreage requirement and, above Paa» because of the acreage 
allotment as well. The profit-maximizing producer elects to participate in 
the feed grain program at low corn prices, Pc < Pci* yielding the lower 
darkened segment of Sc*. For Pc > Pci, the producer does not participate 
and produces along the positively inclined segment of Sc’ above Pci. In
the case depicted in Figure 4, the allotment price, P^a* at whlch the 
producer would encounter the planted acreage restriction, is sufficiently 
above Pci that the allotment is non-binding. The result is a discontinuous 
corn acreage supply curve, Sc ’, the discontinuity technically being a 
result of the different slopes of te* and te’ , from which the underlying 
supply curves are derived.
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FIGURE 4. EXPECTED PROFIT FUNCTIONS AND CORN ACREAGE
WITH NON-BINDING ALLOTMENT
In Figure 5, the alternative case, Pci > Pca* is considered. Expected 
profit functions, acreage supply functions, price and acreage variables are 
defined as above. For low corn price levels, the producer again partici­
pates but eventually encounters the allotment price, at which point the 
acreage allotment is binding, and planted corn acreage can rise no 
further. As the corn price rises above indifference price, Pci, the 
producer elects not to participate and planted corn acreage increases along 
the darkened segment of Sc. Again, the resulting corn acreage response 
curve is discontinuous, reflecting the profit-maximizing producer's shift 
from participation to nonparticipation at indifference price Pci. Although 
this case differs from Figure 4 in that an inelastic portion of the acreage 
supply function results, in both cases, the corn supply function is dis­
continuous and noticably different from the normal supply function appli­
cable under a free market setting. In addition, for any Pc < Pci, corn 
acreage under the feed grain program is, in both cases, less than in its 
absence.
In Figure 6, aggregate corn acreage supply is depicted under the 
circumstances outlined above. We assume that the corn price at which the 
producer is indifferent between participation and nonparticipation is
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FIGURE 5.  EXPECTED PROFIT FUNCTIONS AND CORN ACREAGE
WITH BINDING ALLOTMENT
IS
different for producers in any geographic region. Thus a range of indif­
ference prices, from PCTQ to Pc ,^ is assumed to exist. Above the highest 
indifference price, Pch > all farmers elect nonparticipation and the aggre­
gate acreage supply function would be simply the competitive market supply 
function, SSC- At Pc £  Pcm, all producers participate and aggregate corn 
acreage is less than under free market conditions, given both idled land 
and binding acreage allotments for many producers.
In fact, however, experience with voluntary feed grain programs over 
the 1960's and 1970's demonstrated varying rates of program participation, 
though never at the extremes of zero and 100 percent participation. This 
common case is represented in Figure 6 by the darkened curve, SSC', lying 
to the left and less steeply inclined than the free market supply function, 
SSC. A linear form of SSC ' is assumed here for simplicity, although the 
form that SSC ' would actually assume would depend on the actual distribu­
tion of Indifference prices among farmers in a given geographic region. As 
can be seen in Figure 6, the position of SScf is important in considering 
aggregate corn acreage response under feed grain programs, in that its 
lower slope compared to SS^ implies a higher own—price elasticity of corn 
acreage response under the acreage reduction program compared to competi­
tive market conditions. The specific magnitude of the producers' aggregate 
price responsiveness will depend on the relative values of the market and 
program variables.
26
FIGURE 6. AGGREGATE CORN ACREAGE 
SUPPLY CURVE
Cross-Commodity Effects and Soybean Acreage Supply
The introduction of an acreage restriction program has implications 
not only for the specific crop to be controlled but for the entire produc­
tion system. In Corn Belt states where corn and soybeans are the dominant 
crops, the implications of the abovementioned corn program provisions in 
determining soybean supply responsiveness are important, though often 
unpredictable.
Assume the existence of a feed grain program such as that described 
above, with the price of c o m  held constant. Consider, in Figure 7, the 
shape of expected profit functions for a cotn-soybean producer with respect 
to changes in soybean prices, Pg. Define the expected profit function for 
the nonparticipator by x*(Ps) and for the participator by x1 (P8) • As Pg 
declines from a high level and approaches Psa» the producer plants less 
soybeans and more corn (see quadrant one). At these high expected soybean 
prices, the opportunity cost of participating in the c o m  program (e.g., 
the acreage required to be set aside) is sufficiently high that the pro­
ducer elects not to participate. Thus the soybean acreage supply curve is 
similar to that existing under competitive market conditions.
As soybean prices decline further to Psi*s however, the opportunity 
cost of the set-aside is finally exceeded by the payments available to the 
producer from participating in the program and setting aside acreage equal 
to (aga - a8b)• Above Pg = Pga, though, the corn acreage allotment Is not
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FIGURE 7. EXPECTED PROFIT FUNCTIONS AND SOYBEAN ACREAGE
WITH BINDING AND NON- BINDING A L L O T M E N T S
binding and the producer continues to substitute corn acreage for soybean 
acreage as the relative price of soybeans declines® With a further decline 
in the price of soybeans to "allotment price" level Psa» however, the 
supply-inducing price for corn is now high enough that the participating 
producer encounters the corn acreage constraint imposed by the program. 
Assuming that - asb) equals feed grain base acreage and that (aga - asb) 
is the required set-aside, soybean acreage may not expand beyond the plant­
ing level asb» as prices decline from Ps - Psa- With voluntary acreage 
idling provisions in effect, the producer might elect to set-aside addi­
tional land, with the result that soybean acreage would decline further 
along the dashed section of curve Lg» Without this option, however, the 
soybean acreage supply curve would retain an inelastic portion below Paa*
Finally, as soybean prices decline to an extremely low level (Psj_ )» 
the opportunity cost of the corn allotment becomes high enough that the 
producer leaves the program. The relative price of soybeans is now suffi­
ciently low that removal of the corn acreage constraint induces the
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producer to plant fewer and fewer acres to soybeans as prices decline 
below Ps - Psi« The set-aside payment to the program participant could be 
high enough to outweigh the increasing opportunity cost of the corn allot­
ment as soybean prices decline below Psa. If this were the case, the 
producer would elect participation for most levels of Pg* thus eliminating 
the darkened portion of Ss lying below T?s ±» The above analysis can also be 
easily modified to explain soybean acreage supply in other unique situa­
tions (specialized soybean production, etc*)•
The importance of the preceding analysis lies in the theoretical exis­
tence of two indifference prices in the case of soybean acreage supply.
This stems from the fact that the set-aside payment must be large enough to 
compensate the participating producer for both foregoing production on the 
required set-aside and abiding by the corn acreage allotment. At high 
expected soybean price levels, the opportunity cost created by the first 
constraint is high enough to encourage nonparticipation. At low soybean 
price levels, the cost of the second (allotment) constraint becomes high 
enough to also lead to nonparticipation. At intermediate price levels, 
however, the profit-maximizing producer will elect to participate if the 
opportunity costs of the two constraints decline sufficiently such that 
they are more than compensated for by deficiency payments and other program 
benefits.
Finally, what may be said regarding the aggregate acreage supply 
responsiveness for soybeans? Figure 8 depicts two alternative cases, the 
implications of which depend on assumptions made regarding producers1 
indifference prices. If all producers had identical indifference price 
levels of Psi and P8-l, then the aggregate soybean acreage supply curve 
would be SSg. Instantaneous program entry and exit at price levels Ps£ 
and PS£ makes SSg perfectly elastic at these two prices, and, due to 100 
percent participation between price s Psa and Ps£, soybean supply is per­
fectly inelastic in this portion of the curve. The assumption of identical 
Indifference price levels for all producers makes this alternative extreme­
ly unrealistic, however.
If, thoughj indifference prices vary among producers, a different 
aggregate supply curve (SSs) results. Consider indifference prices 
corresponding to Ps£ which range upward to Ps^ s and those corresponding to 
Ps£ which range downward to Psm. In the upward range, as prices decline 
below P8h, producers increasingly elect to participate, setting aside 
acreage but with the corn allotment not yet binding. Within this range, 
soybean acreage is necessarily less than under competitive conditions 
(curve SSs). Within the lower range, as prices rise to P8m and above, 
producers also join the program, setting aside acreage but also increasing 
soybean acreage as a result of the corn allotment provisions * In this 
case, soybean acreage exceeds that planted under a free market regime. As 
prices rise between Pg^ and Ps ,^ additional producers join the program 
while other producers elect to drop their participation. The resulting 
acreage supply curve * SSs> is essentially a smoothed version of SSs and 
approximates actual soybean acreage supply Under the feed grain program.
Little can be concluded definitively about soybean supply responsive­
ness under partial program participation compared with competitive condi­
tions. Depending on the range of soybean prices, SSg might have a greater,
29
FIGURE 8. AGGREGRATE ACREAGE SUPPLY CURVES 
FOR SOYBEANS WITH AND WITHOUT A 
FEED GRAIN PROGRAM
As
smaller, or equal elasticity than that obtained under a competitive 
market. The magnitude of aggregate soybean supply responsiveness under an 
acreage limiting feed grain program is essentially an empirical question, 
then, depending on the relative magnitudes of soybean prices, corn prices, 
and feed grain program incentives and constraints.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL
This chapter describes a multiple equation econometric model which is 
used to estimate corn and soybean acreage supply response in the four-state 
Corn Belt region. Attention is first given to an alternative method of 
incorporating feed grain program provisions in an empirical supply model. 
The estimation model and data used in the analysis are then described•
Next, Parks' generalized regression procedure, used in the estimation of 
the empirical model, is reviewed. Finally, a test for structural stability 
of coefficient estimates is discussed.
Government Program Variables in Acreage Response Models
As mentioned in Chapter IX, three major types of benefits accrued to 
producers participating in feed grain programs over the post-War period. 
They were: (i) price support loans, (ii) payments for required diversion, 
and (iii) a sequence of price support payments, set-aside payments, and 
deficiency payments. The approach taken here estimates the magnitudes of 
each of these benefits in the relevant years, sums the total benefits 
available to producers in any given year, and incorporates the resulting 
payment estimate as an explanatory variable in the econometric model 
finally estimated.
Price Support Loan Incentives
Price support loans have been available to corn and soybean producers 
in all years and on total production except for 1961-62 for corn, when 
price support loans were available only on "normal" production. The levels 
that these loan rates assumed relative to expected market prices are 
important in contributing to total program participation incentives and, 
ultimately, in determining participation rates. For soybeans, loan rates 
exceeded average market prices in only five of the 33 years between 1948 
and 1980: 1957-58, 1961, and 1967-68 (see Appendix Table A.4). Moreover,
the largest difference between the two prices was only $.09 (in 1958), and 
in three of the five years, the differential was $.02 or less. In only 
three years, 1958, 1961 and 1968, did loan rates exceed market prices 
lagged one year (an approximation to farmers' expected prices the following 
year). Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that the soybean loan rate was 
of negligible importance compared to soybean market prices in the formation 
of producers’ production and planting decisions.
For corn, though, the story is different. Although after 1962 corn 
loan rates exceeded average market prices on only one occasion (1967), in 
1962 and before, loan rates were greater than market prices in all but two 
years, 1950 and 1951. The reason for this change is that beginning in 
1963, in order to stimulate exports and hold down domestic prices, corn 
loan rates were reduced to world price levels, while the price support pay­
ment feature (see below) was added to the feed grain program to enhance 
producers' returns. Thus in the "program" years treated in this study, 
1961-73 and 1978-79, the price support loan rate was an important par­
ticipation incentive only in 1961 and 1962.
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During both of these years, the price support loan incentive (PSLI)
was available on normal production on corn acreage planted in a manner 
estimated as follows:
(4 .1 )  PSL I j  = (Pc* " E j (Pc ) ) ( Y c j ) ( a CpSj )
where Pc* = price support loan,
Ej(Pc) = expected corn market price in state j,
Ycj = historic corn yield in state j, 
and aCpj - planted corn acreage in state j.
Given announced c o m  loan rates equal to $1.20 per bushel in both 1961~62, 
lagged market prices as proxies for expected market prices, exogenously 
determined historic corn yields, and maximum corn plantings for program 
participants of 80 percent of corn base, the PSLI variable can be calcu­
lated for each of the four states in years 1961-62. This is done in Table 
5 . The values are expressed in terms of dollars per required idled acre 
where required idled acres, by definition, equal 20 percent of c o m  base or 
25 percent of maximum corn plantings.
TABLE 5
PRICE SUPPORT LOAN INCENTIVE (PSLI) 
PAYMENTS FOR SELECTED STATES: 1961-62
State 1961 1962
Illinois $28.35 $32.40
Indiana 31.35 37.23
Iowa 34.72 34.71
Ohio 31.35 37.23
Payments for Required Diversion
The second category of payments offered to feed grain producers as 
incentives for participation in the feed grain programs were payments for 
acreage mandatorily idled under the acreage diversion program. These pay­
ments were offered in five years only, 1961—65, after which higher price 
support payments were offered, in part to reflect the discontinuance of 
required diversion payments. These payments were calculated by:
(4.2) DPrj = (.5)(Pc*)(Ycj)(arI) = (.5)(Pc*)(Ycj)(-2ac)
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where ar =* required idled acreage, 
ac = corn base acreage,
and all other variables are defined as previously. In 1963 and for the two 
succeeding years, the payment calculation method was changed slightly to:
(4.3) DPrj = (.2)(PC* + bc)(Y'cj)(SrI)>
reflecting a decrease in the payment rate coefficient from .5 to .2, and 
the addition of a new per bushel ’‘price support payment" (bc) to the (now 
much lower) price support loan rate. Since all components of (4.1) and 
(4.2) were exogenously determined under the acreage diversion program, 
these payments for required diversion (per required idled acre) are easily 
calculated. The estimated payments are summarized in Table 6.
TABLE 6
PAYMENTS FOR REQUIRED DIVERSION (DPr) FOR SELECTED STATES: 1961-65
Year Illinois Indiana Iowa Ohio
1961 40.50 39.20 38.60 39.20
1962 40.50 39.20 38.60 39.20
1963 16.90 16.35 16.10 16.35
1964 18.70 17.90 17.60 17.55
1965 19.30 18.70 18.05 17.95
Price Support Payments, Set-Aside Payments, and Deficiency Payments
Beginning in 1963 and continuing through the set-aside programs of the 
1970’s, payments were made to producers to induce their participation in 
government feed grain programs and to enhance producer incomes in surplus 
years. These payments were called "price support payments" under the 
acreage diversion programs (1963-70), while under the set-aside programs, 
they were referred to as "set-aside payments" (1971-73) and "deficiency 
payments" (1978-79). The methods of calculating these payments changed 
over time as the programs evolved. Each is considered in turn here.
Variable price support payments (PSP's) were first offered to program 
participants in 1963-1965, according to the formula:
(4.4) PSPj - (bc)(Ycj)(acp)
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or the product of the announced per bushel support payment bc (equal to 
$.18 in 1963, $.15 in 1964, and $.20 in 1965), times historic yield, times 
total planted corn acreage. Because total price support payments received 
by farmers varied positively with planted acreage, their net effects on 
aggregate planted acreage were, to some extent, offsetting• While 
increases in bc made program compliance more attractive and thus tended to 
decrease planted acreage, these same increases represented a price premium 
to participants, making increased corn planting within the program guide­
lines more attractive relative to voluntary land diversion. The net effect 
of these two countervailing incentives is difficult to ascertain a priori.
In 1966-1970, the method of calculating price support payments was 
altered, decreasing the positive planting incentive existing under the 
1963-63 programs. The new payment formula was:
(4.5) PSPj = (bc)(Yc ss)(.5ac)
or the product of the announced per bushel payment ($.30 in each year), 
times projected yield (five-year average yield, adjusted for trend)L times 
the smaller of planted acreage or 50 percent of corn base acreage (ac)• 
Since maximum acreage diversion levels ranged from 20 percent of base (in 
1967) to 50 percent of base (in 1966, 1968-70), planted acreage had to at 
least equal 50 percent of base; thus the last term of (4.5) was fixed or 
historically determined as were bc and Yc 9'. Price support payments in 
1966-70, then, represented essentially fixed payments to participating 
producers.
Although the inception of the acreage set-aside program in 1971 is 
often considered to have represented a considerable change in program 
philosophy, the continuation of payments to producers in the form of “set- 
aside payments" rather than price support payments represented only a small 
real change in program operation. Set-aside payments (SAP) were calculated
by:
(4.6) SAP j - - Pc) ( V ) ( o5ac)»
or the product of a differential between a guaranteed return ($1.35 per 
bushel in 1971-72; $1.64 per bushel in 1973) and the marketing year average 
price, times adjusted historic yield, times 50 percent of base acreage. A 
preliminary payment based on an estimate of (P^ — Pc) was announced prior 
to planting and paid to producers before harvest. Since (i) the prelimi­
nary payment ($.32 per bushel in 1971 and 1973; $.40 per bushel in 1972) 
did not have to be returned even if the actual differential was less than 
the estimate, and (ii) the producer received additional payments if the 
actual differential exceeded the estimate, the preliminary payment repre­
sented an essentially fixed guarantee to the producer, as under the earlier 
diversion program.
During the final two years of production control programs considered 
here, 1978-79, the method of calculating program benefits, now called
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"deficiency payments", was changed considerably. Deficiency payments were 
variable in nature, and calculated according to the formula;
(4.7) DFPj = (Pc1 - max(Pc*, PC))(YC ')(<x)(acp),
where Pct equals the target price for corn ($2.10 per bushel in 1978; $2.20 
per bushel in 1979), Pc* is the corn loan rate, Pc is the corn market 
price, Yc ' is historic yield, aCp is planted corn acreage, and a is the 
"allocation factor" (see explanation in Chapter II). The deficiency pay­
ment rate was a maximum $.10 per bushel in 1978 and $.20 per bushel in 
1979. For producers who exceeded the most stringent planting requirements, 
a was reduced proportionately, thus decreasing the effective deficiency 
payments received. In estimating program benefits, an allocation factor 
equal to one is assumed here.
Based on announced program provisions, an allocation factor equal to 
one, and maximum permitted corn plantings under the series of programs, It 
is possible to estimate the relevant price support, set-aside, and defi­
ciency payments payable to participating producers in the four states.
This is done in Table 7. Again, payments are expressed in terms of dollars 
per required idled acre under the program.
Total Program Participation Incentives
As reviewed above, three broad categories of payments were made to 
grain producers participating In feed grain programs over the period 
1961-1979. Ideally, estimates of each of these payments in each sample 
state would be available for every year in the sample period, permitting 
their inclusion as independent variables In an econometric model of acreage 
supply. In fact, however, each of the types of payments was available in 
only a small subsample of years; price support Incentives in 1961-62, 
payments for required diversion in 1961-65, price support payments in 
1963-70, set-aside payments in 1971-73, and deficiency payments in 
1978-79. On the other hand, all of these types of payments had the same 
main objective, viz., encouraging a basic level of participation in feed 
grain programs. This fact, along with the discontinuities of the payment 
variables themselves, suggests the necessity of aggregating the various 
participation incentive payments into a "total incentive payment" measure 
to be included In the econometric analysis which follows.
The TIP variable, then, measures the sum of all participation incen­
tives relevant in each sample year. Table 8 illustrates the values taken 
by TIP for the four sample states over the program regime years. Since the 
values of TIP are expressed in terms of payments per required idled acre, 
these values measure the estimated gross returns to an acre of idled crop­
land under program participation. If idled or diverted acreage is thought 
of as an alternative "crop", then increases in TIP would be expected to 
lead to increased program participation, higher levels of idled acreage, 
and lower levels of corn acreage, ceteris paribus.
In addition to the incentives provided by feed grain programs to 
encourage a basic level of program participation, in most years, further
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payments were offered to those producers who voluntarily idled additional 
acreage. As can be seen in Table 3, these provisions were incorporated 
into feed grain programs in all years between 1961 and 1979, except for 
1967, 1971, and 1973. While payments for voluntary diversion were in most 
cases formulated differently than payments for required diversion, their 
main impact was in their being paid on higher levels of acreage diversion. 
These varying diversion levels are incorporated in the variable described 
next.
Acreage Diversion Limits
The feed grain program benefits reviewed above were not available to 
producers on an unlimited basis. Acreage planting constraints and diver­
sion requirements accompanied program payment incentives and these con­
straints were important in determining aggregate crop acreage levels.
Xn all years except for 1978—79, minimum acreage diversion levels 
required of producers were expressed as a percent of historic crop base 
acreages. In 1961-70, these minimum diversion levels were 20 percent of 
historically defined feed grain base acreage. As noted previously, after 
1965, if a producer was eligible for and elected to take advantage of the 
feed grain-wheat substitution provisions, he also had to idle 20 percent of 
his wheat allotment. The 20 percent level of required diversion continued 
through the set-aside program of 1971, after which the level was raised to 
25 percent of base in 1972 and then lowered to 10 percent in 1973. 
Throughout the 1961-73 period, adjustments of base acreage and wheat allot­
ments were made on individual farms to reflect local conditions. However, 
at the state level of aggregation, year-to-year changes in required diver­
sion levels were minor, as revealed in Table 9.
Ceilings on additional voluntary acreage diversions were less stable 
over the 1960’s and 1970's. In 1961-63 and during the set-aside program of 
1972, ceilings were set at 20 percent of feed grain base, while In the 
years 1964-1970 (excluding 1967) maximum voluntary paid diversion levels 
were increased to 30 percent of base acreage. In 1967, 1971, and 1973, no 
paid voluntary diversion was permitted. Statewide voluntary diversion 
levels assuming full program compliance are given in Table 9.
In 1978-79, unlike previous years, both required set-asides and volun­
tary diversion levels were expressed as proportions (10 percent in each 
case) of current feed grain planting level rather than in terms of historic 
base acreage. However, since maximum deficiency payment rates were only 
made available to producers limiting their corn plantings to specified 
proportions of the previous year’s planted acreage, it is possible to 
specify effective diversion limits assuming full program compliance. Since 
these planting limitations were specified as 95 percent of 1977 acreage in 
1978 and 90 percent of 1978 "considered" planted acreage in 1979, the 
effective required and voluntary diversion limits were 10 percent of each 
figure, or 9.5 percent and 9.0 percent of the previous year’s corn plant­
ings in 1978 and 1979, respectively. These figures are also given in Table 
9.
As reviewed in Chapter 2, the 1961-79 feed grain programs also stipu­
lated planted acreage limitations or allotments in most years. In 1961-
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1970, given the lack of major changes in program formulation, these acreage 
limitations were highly stable. Even under the less restrictive set-aside 
programs of the 19701s, producers were offered higher payment rates for 
abiding by planted acreage restrictions in 1972, 1978, and 1979. Only in 
1971 and 1973, were there no limitations (explicit or implicit) on planted 
c o m  acreage. Given the high degree of stability of aggregate planted 
acreage limitations, explicit measures of these limitations were not 
included in the analysis below.
Econometric Model
The discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 provides the basis for the estima­
tion of an econometric model of corn and soybean acreage supply for the 
four-state area, the specification of which is primarily dependent on the 
existence or absence of acreage-controlling government feed grain pro­
grams * In the absence of these programs, acreage supply functions for corn 
and soybeans under a "free market regime" may be specified for the four
states as follows:
(4.8) ACit “ fi(pcit-l> PSit-l» X) i=l, ..., 4
(4.9) ASit - 8i(pcit-l> psit-l» T) 1=1, .»•, 4
where and A S ^  are the acreages planted to corn and soybeans in state
i in year t, and PS-^ t_^ are the relative prices of corn and soybeans
in state i in year t-1, and T is a trend variable representing systematic 
excluded variables which influence planted acreage (e.g., technological 
change). Price variables PCit_i and are average state market prices
in year t-1 divided by an index of prices of variable inputs used in crop 
production (see below). The four states included In the analysis are all 
in the geographically homogeneous Corn Belt area: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
and Ohio. Sets of equations (4.8) and (4.9) were estimated using a multi­
ple equation generalized least squares regression procedure applicable to 
pooled cross-section time-series data (see discussion below).
The free market regime includes the twelve years from 1948 through 
1980 in which no acreage control programs were applied to feed grain crops: 
1948-49, 1951-53, 1959-60, 1974-77, and 1980. Some farm program benefits 
were available to producers during those years (price support loans, etc.), 
however, relatively high market prices and a lack of acreage controls meant 
that cash grain producers responded to largely competitive market forces in 
formulating their acreage allocation decisions.
In other years, as has been described previously, the existence of 
feed grain programs and the alternatives they created for grain producers 
fundamentally altered production decisions. For these "farm program 
regime" years, 1961-73 and 1978-79, the important role played by program 
payments and constraints in determining feed grain acreage necessitates an 
alternative specification of state corn acreage supply functions:
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(4.10) AC'it: - hjiCPCit^ x, PSit_lt TIPit, ADVlt, T) 1=1, ..., 4
where TIP^t represents the total incentive payments available to producers 
(expressed in dollars per required idled acre), ADV^t is the maximum state 
acreage diversion level (expressed in numbers of acres), and all other 
variables are defined as before. Increases in TIP^t represent increased 
expected returns from idling acreage as required under feed grain programs, 
and thus, ceteris paribus, are expected to lead to greater rates of program 
participation, higher levels of aggregate acreage diversions or set-asides, 
and consequently, lower levels of planted corn acreage. Increases in 
ADV^t, as reviewed above, are due largely to increases in voluntary diver­
sion limits since these increases represent (i) greater incentives to 
participate in the feed grain program and (li) increased competition for 
corn acreage on a relatively fixed cropland base. Given these factors, the 
expected sign on the regression coefficient on ADVit is also expected to be 
negative.
Sets of supply response equations are also estimated for state soybean 
acreage under the farm program regime. Two formulations were used due to 
the a priori uncertainty regarding the effects of corn program variables on 
soybean acreage:
(4.11) AS'it = mi(PCit_i, PSit„l3 T) i-1, 4
(4.12) AS'it - FSi£ml, TIPit, ADVlt, T) i=l, ..., 4
All variables are defined as previously.
In equations (4.11), the corn program variables were excluded since 
initial empirical results did not conclusively indicate significant struc­
tural change in coefficient (elasticity) estimates over the two regimes.
The model was also estimated with the corn program variables included, 
given the arguments presented in Chapter 3 as well as the historical 
importance of the "safety valve" effect of feedgrain programs in soybean 
acreage. Given these reasons, a different supply responsiveness of state 
soybean acreage might be expected under the farm program regime compared to 
the free market regime. However, it is not possible to state a priori the 
expected signs of the coefficients of the program variables TIPit and 
ADV^t in equation (4.12).
Data
The dependent variables in equations (4.8) through (4.12) represent 
the acreages planted to corn and soybeans in the four-state area. Because 
planted corn grain acreage data is not available on a consistent basis over 
the entire 1948-80 sample period, corn and soybean harvested acreage data 
from U.S.D.A's. Agricultural Statistics is used as a proxy for planted 
acreage. Planted acreage data for corn and soybeans is listed in Appendix 
Tables A.2 and A.3.
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Relative price variables and PS^t-l are the ratios of one year
lagged average state market prices for corn and soybeans, respectively, to 
an index of prices for variable inputs used in crop production. Lagged 
market prices are one of several proxies that have been used to measure 
producer price expectations. Alternative measures have included distri­
buted lags of past prices and indexes of futures price (Gardner; Morzuch, 
Weaver, and Helmberger). Lagged market prices are generally highly corre­
lated with other price expectation proxies, which has led to their frequent 
use in supply analysis (recent examples include Whittaker and Bancroft,
Reed and Riggins)«
An input price index is used in this study to adjust output prices for 
changes in the prices paid by farmers for the variable inputs used in crop 
production: seed, fertilizer, motor vehicles and supplies, farm machinery,
and farm supplies• Given the lack of sufficient input utilization data, it 
is not possible to construct "true" price indexes for variable inputs 
(e.g•, Laspeyres, Paasche, or Divisia Indexes)• Instead, weights are 
assigned to each category of input prices in proportion to weights devel­
oped by the U.S.D.A. for use through 1964, and revised in 1965 (Stauber, 
Hale, and Peterson; U.S.D.A. Crop Reporting Board). These weights are 
given in Table 10. Individual input price indexes were obtained from the 
U.S.D.A.'s Agricultural Prices publication. The resulting variable input 
price index is given in Appendix Table A.5• Adjustment of output price 
variables by the input price index restricts equations (4.8)-(4.12) to be 
homogeneous of degree zero in prices, as suggested by economic theory.
The government program variables, TIP and ADV included In equations 
(4.10) and (4.12) for the farm program regime have been explained in detail 
above and require no further treatment here. A trend variable is included 
in each acreage equation as a proxy for technological change, an important 
factor in producer decision-making, but one which is exceedingly difficult 
to quantify. All variables are expressed in logarithms, so that equations
(4.8)-(4.12) are In log-linear functional form.
Estimation Procedure
Each of the sets of equations (4.8)-(4.12) includes acreage supply 
equations for the four states considered in this study. Given their 
continguous location, relatively high degree of geographic homogeneity, and 
similar cropping systems, it is reasonable to assume that weather and other 
exogenous forces have generally similar impacts on planting decisions 
throughout the region. This implies that error terms in each set of crop 
acreage response equations across the four states will be contemporaneously 
correlated, which in turn suggests the use of multiple equation generalized 
least squares regression procedures to arrive at efficient coefficient 
estimates. Few previous acreage response studies have used multiple 
equation procedures in estimating supply relationships, though notable 
exceptions include Whittaker and Bancroft's use of a pooled time-series 
cross-section model and Reed and Riggins * use of a seemingly unrelated 
regression model•
A common procedure in such cases is the two—stage Zellner-Aitken or 
Zellner efficient (ZEF) method of estimation in which: (1) OLS is applied 
to each equation in the system yielding residuals which are then used in
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TABLE 10
VARIABLE INPUT GROUPS AND WEIGHTS: 1948-1964; 1965-1980
YEARS AND INPUT GROUPS WEIGHTS*
1948-64:
Seed .090
Fertilizer .145
Motor Supplies .155
Motor Vehicles .184
Farm Machinery .296
Farm Supplies .130
1.000
1965-80:
Seed .078
Fertilizer .182
Agricultural Chemicals .108
Fuels, Energy .195
Farm Supplies .117
Autos, Trucks .152
Tractors, Self-Propelled Machines .095
Other Machinery .074
1.000
^Weights are proportions of total variable input price index in each 
group. Sources: Stauber, Hale, and Peterson. Ag. Econ. Res. 1959. USDA
Crop Reporting Board, "Index numbers of prices received and prices paid by 
fanners." May 1976.
computing the estimated variance and covariance elements of 2; and £2) the 
19true" coefficient vector £  is then estimated by the ZEE estimator |_:
(4.13) |  - [X'CS-1 x I)X]-1 [X1(f-1 x l)y]
where: y - the vector of observations on all state acreage variables
X - the block diagonal matrix of observations on K explanatory 
variables for each state,
and 2 Is the estimated covariance matrix which takes the form
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(4.14) i
SllIT S12IT S13IT S14IT
S22IT S23IT S24IT
S31IT c T 32 T S33IT S34XT
C Ta41 T S42IT S42XT S44XX
The ZEF estimator has been shown to be unbiased if the mean of exists and 
if b is symmetrically distributed around £  (Kakwani), and to be asymptoti­
cally efficient.
An additional complication arises here in the ZEF estimation of 
equations (4.8)-(4.12), however. Though rarely corrected for in acreage 
response studies, autocorrelation frequently characterizes estimated 
acreage supply equations. In the preliminary supply equations estimated 
over the entire time series in this analysis, high degrees of auto­
correlation of error terms were found to characterize all state equations 
for both corn and soybeans. In order to correct for both this autocorrela­
tion and the contemporaneous correlation across equations, Parks' "three- 
stage Aitken method" was employed to correct for both problems. Parks' 
procedure involves: (i) OLS regression and the estimation of an auto­
correlation coefficient p (using the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure) for each 
equation separately, (ii) adjustment of variables in each equation based on 
p, and (iii) estimation of the entire set of equations using the ZEF 
estimator (4.13). Given the high autocorrelation coefficients encountered 
in the preliminary analysis, and the likelihood of contemporaneous 
correlation across individual equations in a multiple equation system, the 
Parks procedure provides a method for obtaining more efficient regression 
coefficient estimates than would otherwise be obtainable.
Because of the low number of observations (years) in each of the two 
regimes analyzed, a restricted version of the generalized regression model 
was estimated in each case. In the final step of each regression 
procedure, cross-equation equality restrictions were imposed on all 
coefficients, except intercept terms which were allowed to vary across 
states. Since all equations were estimated in log-linear form, these 
equality restrictions meant that supply elasticities were restricted to 
being equal across all four states under each regime. Given the geographic 
homogeneity and similarities of grain cropping patterns of these four 
states, these restrictions appear justifiable.
Testing for Structural Change
The issue of structural change in corn and soybean acreage supply 
response over the free market and farm program regimes may be examined 
statistically. A number of tests have been used in testing for structural 
stability (Wald, LaGrange, likelihood ratio), though it must be noted that
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in the multiple equation case, the same estimated covariance matrix must be 
used in arriving at unconstrained and constrained coefficient estimates*
The LaGrange test was used here to test for coefficient stability* The 
relevant test statistic is:
(4*15) Tr(X
where: T r < V
HI
C!
K
L
T
R' U'
T r O ^ / T  - KL (KL, T-KL)
estimates,
- trace of the variance matrix of 
estimates,
- number of independent variables 
= number of equations, and
=■ number of observations.
Estimated F-statistics in the critical F region would lead to rejection of 
the null hypothesis of coefficient stability across regimes, providing some 
confirmation of the arguments presented in Chapter III and of the 
usefulness of the dual regime estimation model.
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CHAPTER V 
ESTIMATION RESULTS
This chapter presents the empirical results from estimation of the 
econometric models developed in Chapter Four, and discusses these results 
in light of the theoretical discussion of Chapter Three and previous 
research. After presenting the results from the structural change tests, 
attention is devoted first to the results of the estimation of the corn 
acreage response equations and then to the empirical results for the soy­
bean acreage equations.
Tests for Structural Change
The hypothesis of crop supply response stability over the free market 
and farm program regimes was tested using the LaGrange test, as outlined in 
Chapter Four. Specifically, the hypothesis tested was the null hypothesis 
that the coefficient vector estimated for each crop under the free market 
regime (equations (4.8) and (4.9)) was equal to the coefficient vector 
estimated under an expanded farm program regime (equations (4.10) and 
(4.11)). For the purposes of this test only, all non-free market regime 
years in the 1948-1980 period were included in the farm program regime. 
Imposition of the required cross equation restrictions in a generalized 
least squares regression amounts to a regression using data from the total 
sample years, 1948-1980, with K (the number of independent variables in 
each state acreage equation) equal to four (representing an intercept term, 
PCit-i, PSit-1* and T), L (the number of state acreage equations in each 
estimated model) equal to four, and T (the number of total time series 
observations) equal to 132 (33 years times four).
The restricted GLS regression using the Parks' procedure described 
previously yields an estimated cavariap.ce matrix of restricted transformed 
residuals, Er, the trace of which, Tr(£r) is used in calculating the test 
statistic. Allowing the estimated coefficient vectors to vary over the two 
regimes amounts to estimating equations (4.8) - (4.11) in an unrestricted 
form, which yields the trape of the covariance matrix of unrestricted 
transformed residuals, Tr(£u). In this case, the LaGrange test statistic 
given by equation (4.15) becomes:
(5.1) Tr(Er) - Tr(£u)/16
Tr(2u)/116
F(l6>116)
where the critical F(16,116) value equals 1.75. The F-statistic (5.1) was 
calculated for both corn and soybean crops over the 1948-1980 sample 
period, with the results given in Table 11.
The results indicate that the hypothesis of supply response stability 
over the free market and farm program regimes is rejected for corn. This 
is not surprising given the results of the theoretical model of Chapter 
Three, which pointed to a fundamentally different acreage allocation
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TABLE 11: TESTING STABILITY IN CROP SUPPLY RESPONSE
Crop ■Tr(Zu ) Tr(Er) ^(16*116) f(.05) H° :~^FMR_1^ PPR
Corn 2.9025 3.9194 2.544 1.75 reject
Soybeans 3.2520 3.7778 1.175 1.75 do not reject
allocation problem for the cash grain producer in the presence of an 
acreage limiting feed grain program compared to the situation existing in a 
freely competitive market. The result provides support for the disaggre­
gated approach taken here with regard to corn acreage response.
In the case of the soybean acreage equations, the hypothesis of equal 
supply responsiveness over the two regimes is not rejected. This result is 
not entirely surprising given the problems described in Chapter Three in 
modeling soybean acreage response to changes in corn programs, in partic­
ular, the offsetting effects that those programs had in influencing planted 
soybean acreage. However, given the uncertainty surrounding the nature of 
those effects, it is interesting that their net_ effect in influencing soy­
bean acreage does not appear to result in a statistically significant 
change from soybean acreage response under a free market» Since the dis­
cussion of Chapter Three suggests that corn program variables are nonethe­
less important in determining non-program crop acreage (e.g. soybean 
acreage) in some years, the conservative research approach is to estimate 
soybean supply equation separately for each regime, leaving open the like­
lihood of similar supply responsiveness under both regimes. This is the 
procedure followed below.
Corn Acreage Supply Response
Generalized least squares estimates of the sets of corn acreage supply 
equations (4.8) and (4.9) yield the results in Table 12. Following Parks’ 
procedure, ordinary least squares was first applied to each state acreage 
equation to test for autocorrelation in the individual equations. Esti­
mated autocorrelation coefficients ranged from -42 to .48, and indicated a 
statistically significant presence of autocorrelation in the residuals of 
each equation. The Cochrane-Orcutt procedure was employed to adjust for 
autocorrelation in each case.
The resulting GLS coefficient estimates for the corn acreage equations 
under the free market regime are statistically significant1 and the signs 
on the own and cross-price variables have the expected positive and nega­
tive signs, respectively. For the four-state region overall, a relatively 
low own price elasticity of supply equal to * 118 is estimated» with a
1Use of the GLS procedure outlined above means that the ratios of coeffi­
cient estimates to their standard errors indicate only approximate statis­
tical significance.
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cross-price elasticity with respect to soybean price of -.166. The trend
variable is positively signed and statistically significant.
For the farm program regime, coefficient estimates are also statisti­
cally significant, excepting the coefficient on relative soybean price.
The results provide substantial support for the argument of variable price 
responsiveness developed previously. An own-price elasticity of supply of 
.239 is estimated over the program years, over twice the magnitude of the 
estimated supply elasticity in free market years. Though the estimated 
soybean price coefficient has an unexpected positive sign, it is not 
statistically significant, confirming the relative weakness of cross-price 
responsiveness of corn acreage supply under acreage controlling feed grain 
programs. The estimated coefficients on the farm program variables are 
also statistically significant with the expected negative signs, indicating 
that program payments and acreage limitations were in fact significant 
determinants of corn acreage supply under this regime. The negative signs 
on the coefficients suggest that increases in payment incentives led, 
through increased program participation, to lower planting levels, while 
increases in idled acreage limitations competed with planted corn acreage 
in the Corn Belt region.
These results corroborate earlier findings by Weaver and Krainick 
which also pointed toward an increasing corn supply responsiveness under 
feed grain programs. They also provide some explanation for Whittaker and 
Bancroft's estimates of a higher corn acreage supply elasticity in the 
1963-1974 period than had been estimated for a period including earlier 
years. Based on the preceding arguments and these empirical results, there 
seems to be substantial support for the argument that the introduction of 
government feed grain programs has led to an increasing supply responsive­
ness of corn in relevant periods of the past two decades. Thus, it would 
appear that use of the constant elasticity estimates which are given by 
models which do not adequately incorporate the effects of program-induced 
structural change in corn acreage supply may lead to biased estimates of 
corn supply responsiveness.
Soybean Acreage Supply Response
The coefficient estimates for the soybean supply equations given in 
Table 13 are less conclusive than those estimated for corn. This outcome 
was not entirely unexpected, given the parameter stability results obtained 
previously and the theoretical discussion in Chapter Three. As in the case 
of the corn acreage equations, estimated autocorrelation coefficients for 
the individual state equations are high, ranging from .315 to .505. After 
correction for autocorrelation, GLS estimation of the soybean acreage 
equations for the free market years yielded a restricted supply elasticity 
estimate of .345, within the range of previous estimates (see Chapter 2). 
The expected negative sign on the relative corn price coefficient and posi­
tive signs on the soybean price and trend coefficients were confirmed.
For the farm program regime, two different acreage supply models were 
estimated, one excluding and one including the feed grain program variables 
as regressors, models A and B , respectively• Non-rejection of the hypothe­
sis of parameter stability for soybean supply response (see Table 11)
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implies that the free market model (with program variables excluded) 
effectively explains variation in soybean acreage supply in feed grain 
program years as well as in non-program years* Based on this result, model 
A was estimated, yielding a restricted soybean supply elasticity estimate 
of .291. Although this estimate is less than the elasticity estimate for 
the free market regime, the difference is small, as would be expected given 
non-rejection of the parameter stability hypothesis.
Model B was estimated with the feed grain program variables included. 
Inclusion of these variables as regressors lowered the estimate of the 
soybean acreage supply elasticity to a statistically non-significant .02. 
However, in this formulation, the program variables themselves proved to be 
significant determinants of planted soybean acreage levels. The positive 
sign on the coefficient of the TIP variable measuring feed grain payment 
incentives indicates that increases in program participation incentives 
have in fact had an effect in inducing the substitution of soybean plant­
ings with corn acreage limitations in effect. This "safety valve" effect 
(Walker and Penn) is one reason why acreage limitation programs have often 
not had their intended effects in controlling crop acreage.
Feed grain acreage diversion limits (ADV) also have a significant 
effect on soybean acreage, though the sign of the estimated coefficient is 
negative. This implies that the potential positive influences of diversion 
ceiling increases on soybean acreage (through increased participation 
incentives) are dominated by the competitive relationship between diverted 
land and soybean acreage, both being substitutes for corn acreage. The 
positive response of soybean acreage to decreases in corn prices under feed 
grain programs is further confirmed by the highly negative cross-price 
elasticity of soybean acreage with respect to corn price (-.458). In sum, 
these results provide considerable support for Walker and Penn’s statement 
that "soybean acreage was more responsive to feed grain program changes 
than own-price changes over much of the post-War period (p. 56). Despite 
the parameter stability tests discussed above, the empirical results pre­
sented here in large measure confirm the importance of considering changes 
in feed grain program provisions in accounting for soybean acreage trends 
when those programs are in effect.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER VI
The theoretical discussion, econometric model and empirical results 
presented in this paper have been concerned with analyzing the effects of 
government feed grain programs on corn and soybean acreage supply response 
in a four-state region of the U«S. Midwest. In recent years, more than 50 
percent of total U.S. production of these two crops has originated in the 
region comprised of the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa and Ohio. At the 
same time, the high degree of substitutability between corn and soybeans 
for cash grain producers in this region suggests that the effects of pro­
duction-controlling feed grain programs on forthcoming crop acreage 
supplies would be particularly evident in this region. Thus, the Corn Belt 
area serves as a prime case study for the analysis of the effects of 
government feed grain programs.
While the analysis of commodity supply response has been a frequent 
focus of agricultural economics research, relatively little attention has 
been given to modeling the feed grain producer's program participation 
decision and the implications of this decision for aggregate supply 
response. Using an expected profit function approach and the concept of 
indifference prices, the discussion in Chapter Three presented a method 
through which the individual producer's participation decision may be 
analyzed. Through this analysis, it was concluded that the aggregate corn 
acreage supply curve under an optional acreage curtailment program was 
likely to be more elastic than that existing in the absence of such a 
program. On the other hand, the theoretical model also provided a basis 
for arguing that corn acreage limitation programs often have had offsetting 
effects on soybean acreage, such that the net effect on forthcoming soybean 
acreage supplies is inconclusive. These results were subsequently con­
firmed by the empirical analysis.
The usefulness of the "effective price" concept in explaining the 
effects of government farm programs on crop acreage has been questioned in 
past research. An alternative method of incorporating program incentives 
and constraints was presented in which the primary program variables 
included in the estimated supply models measured participation incentives 
to producers and maximum acreage diversion limits under feed grain pro­
grams . In incorporating these variables into the empirical models, a dual 
"free market" and "farm program" regime formulation was developed which 
explicitly permits varying price responsiveness across two markedly differ­
ent production environments. To a large extent, use of this empirical 
framework avoids the considerable conceptual problems arising from the 
inclusion, in a single model, of years in which competitive market force 
exerted dominant influences on farmers' decisions, and years in which farm 
programs were of major importance.
In. estimating acreage supply equations, commonly encountered econo­
metric problems such as autocorrelation of error terras have often been 
overlooked. However, adequately dealing with empirical problems such as 
autocorrelation often results in estimation results which differ sub­
stantially from those which do not make the necessary corrections and
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adjustments. Given the empirical problem of simultaneously estimating 
acreage response functions for states in a contiguous, homogeneous area, a 
multiple equation generalised least squares regression procedure was used. 
Given the extent to which autocorrelation proved to be a problem in indi­
vidual state supply equations, Parks5 three-stage Aitken procedure was used 
to simultaneously correct for autocorrelation and contemporaneous correla­
tion of equation error terms in arriving at efficient coefficient esti­
mates. Tests for structural change in crop supply responsiveness under 
free market and farm program regimes using the LaGrange test were also 
performed to confirm the theoretical and empirical modeling approaches 
presented.
The empirical results obtained from estimation of the multiple equa­
tion acreage response models largely confirmed the dual regime approach to 
corn acreage supply response. Corn acreage was estimated to have a supply 
elasticity in the presence of feed grain programs over twice the magnitude 
of that estimated in their absence. Variables measuring feed grain program 
incentives and constraints were demonstrated to'be significant determinants 
of corn acreage supply in the relevant years« These result s imply not only 
that corn acreage is responsive to the existence and nature of feed grain 
program provisions when they are in effect, but that empirical models which 
fail to adequately differentiate between years in which acreage constrain­
ing programs are or are not in effect may be of questionable relevance in 
any given year.
In the case of the soybean supply equations, the results are less 
definitive, as expected given the preceding theoretical discussion. While 
the "slippage" of corn base acreage into soybean production may be pre­
dicted given the provisions of feed grain programs, the competitive rela­
tionships existing between soybean and set-aside acreage suggests that 
soybean acreage may decline under acreage control programs• It is uncer 
tain a priori which situation will prevail on balance. The empirical 
results show that the soybean acreage supply elasticity declines in the 
presence of feed grain programs though the magnitude of the decline is 
inconclusive. Importantly, feed grain program payment and acreage con­
straint variables were found to be significant determinants of soybean 
acreage when those programs were in effect® In fact, under the farm 
program regime, soybean acreage appeared to be insensitive to corn price 
changes and highly sensitive to program variables. The empirical results 
also confirmed the competitive relationship existing between soybean 
acreage and idled acreage, both being competitors for corn base acreage.
In sum, the dual regime model presented in this paper proves quite 
useful in analyzing the impacts of government feed grain programs over much 
of the post-War period. A variety of effects of those programs are consis­
tently explained by the theoretical approach and empirical results pre­
sented here. The main conclusion that derives from the above analysis is 
that empirical supply studies of crops subject to government farm programs 
must give adequate attention to the effects of those programs on crop 
supply response•
The results of this analysis suggest several promising areas for 
future research. In particular, greater attention needs to be devoted to 
the farm program participation decision. This decision is fundamental to
53
the analysis of aggregate supply response, yet has received relatively 
little attention. Additional research is required in examining the impli­
cations and tradeoffs involved in multiple product production systems. 
McKinzie, Binkley, and Gardiner have recently addressed this problem. 
Finally, further research on the aggregate analysis of crop acreage 
responsiveness under changing farm programs is required. A forthcoming 
paper examines the implications of the disaggregated model presented here 
for forecasting purposes (see Lee and Helmberger), but additional research 
on other crops and programs is needed.
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TABLE A. 1
TOTAL CROPLAND BASES FOR FOUR STATES*: 1947-1980
YEAR ILLINOIS INDIANA IOWA OHIO TOTALFOUR
STATES
1947 19,797 10,678 21,448 10,156 62,079
1948 20,802 11,226 22,332 10,821 65,181
1949 20,800 11,274 22,827 10,851 65,752
1950 20,611 11,034 22,582 10,534 64,761
1951 20,650 11,092 21,766 10,587 64,095
1952 20,955 11,215 22,463 10,739 65,372
1953 21,373 11,297 22,791 10,897 66,358
1954 21,273 11,406 22,820 10,688 66,187
1955 21,206 11,409 23,113 10,436 66,164
1956 21,475 11,373 22,888 10,308 66,044
1957 20,733 11,143 23,454 10,430 65,760
1958 21,120 11,266 23,592 10,492 66,470
1959 21,583 11,645 23,639 10,580 67,447
1960 21,686 11,844 23,780 10,238 67,548
1961 22,127 12,262 24,027 10,376 68,792
1962 22,175 12,347 23,930 10,423 68,875
1963 22,068 12,322 24,027 10,425 68,842
1964 22,211 12,379 24,094 10,306 68,990
1965 22,450 12,039 24,030 10,455 68,974
1966 22,517 12,128 24,141 10,508 69,294
1967 22,369 12,035 23,810 10,389 68,603
1968 22,655 12,270 24,205 10,299 69,429
1969 22,548 12,395 24,004 10,124 69,071
1970 22,285 12,182 24,237 10,238 68,942
1971 22,522 12,209 24,310 10,377 69,418
1972 23,061 12,496 25,027 10,494 71,078
1973 22,278 11,996 24,551 10,000 68,825
1974 22,270 12,192 24,057 10,661 69,180
1975 22,906 12,259 24,334 10,731 70,230
1976 23,030 12,476 24,316 10,698 70,520
1977 23,441 12,664 24,559 10,837 71,501
1978 23,793 12,776 25,783 10,934 73,286
1979 24,127 12,743 25,818 11,150 73,838
1980 24,002 12,878 25,646 11,040 73,566
*Totals for each state in each year equal sum of harvested acres of 59 
major crops, and acres idled under feedgrain, wheat, and Soil Bank, 
programs.
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TABLE A .2
CORN ACREAGE HARVESTED, FOUR STATES: 1948-1980
YEAR ILLINOIS INDIANA IOWA OHIO TOTAL
FOUR
STATES
1948 8,965 4,665 10,732 3,506 27,868
1949 9,021 4,703 11,104 3,454 28,282
1950 8,008 4,227 9,396 3,155 24,786
1951 8,483 4,396 9,680 3,334 25,893
1952 8,728 4,458 10,449 3,382 27,017
1953 9,049 4,562 10,811 3,358 27,780
1954 8,699 4,665 10,014 3,530 26,908
1955 8,885 4,798 10,293 3,592 27,568
1956 8,477 4,592 9,413 3,415 25,897
1957 7,894 4,222 9,860 3,146 25,122
1958 8,244 4,291 9,733 3,167 25,435
1959 9,789 5,095 12,077 3,740 30,701
1960 9,985 5,152 12,166 3,383 30,686
1961 8,188 4,173 9,976 2,537 24,874
1962 8,270 4,298 9,776 2,663 25,007
1963 8,849 4,599 10,656 2,903 27,007
1964 9,182 4,737 9,804 2,961 26,684
1965 9,777 4,701 9,933 3,054 27,465
1966 10,342 5,077 10,132 3,115 28,666
1967 10,788 5,382 11,145 3,240 30,555
1968 10,088 4,790 9,808 2,884 27,570
1969 9,698 4,742 9,514 2,740 26,694
1970 9,940 4,923 10,077 3,040 27,980
1971 10,070 5,509 11,550 3,545 30,674
1972 9,225 4,884 10,600 3,090 27,799
1973 9,530 5,240 11,280 3,040 29,090
1974 9,900 5,460 12,000 3,650 31,010
1975 10,810 5,630 12,300 3,490 32,230
1976 11,590 6,300 12,900 3,820 34,610
1977 11,080 6,210 12,700 3,620 33,610
1978 11,170 6,200 12,850 3,610 33,830
1979 11,050 6,030 13,100 3,630 33,810
1980 11,460 6,280 13,300 3,900 34,940
SOURCE i U.S.D.A. Agricultural Statistics. 1948-1980.
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
URCEs
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SOYBEAN ACREAGE HARVESTED, FOUR STATES: 1948-1980
TABLE A.3
ILLINOIS INDIANA IOWA OHIO
3,354 1,459 1,564 908
3,287 1,442 1,340 858
3,989 1,652 1,930 1,090
3,731 1,706 1,583 1,124
3,716 1,683 1,526 940
3,846 1,808 1,657 1,036
4,143 1,939 2,129 1,122
4,328 2,039 2,261 1,193
4,649 2,142 2,500 1,301
4,914 2,174 2,857 1,421
5,066 2,269 3,116 1,441
4,796 2,312 2,369 1,472
4,973 2,415 2,599 1,499
5,520 2,681 3,405 1,722
5,575 2,708 3,405 1,791
5,575 2,735 3,575 1,755
5,734 2,817 4,254 1,860
6,021 2,871 4,850 2,044
5,941 2,814 4,996 2,105
6,009 2,898 5,246 2,231
6,663 3,246 5,561 2,276
6,730 3,311 5,450 2,344
6,800 3,278 5,680 2,550
7,150 3,377 5,500 2,634
7,520 3,688 6,000 3,010
8,930 4,290 7,750 3,590
8,440 3,890 7,110 3,190
8,220 3,630 6,970 3,100
7,560 3,280 6,450 2,880
8,850 3,900 7,080 3,380
9,240 4,180 7,550 3,750
9,720 4,420 8,170 4,080
9,250 4,380 8,270 3,760
Agricultural Statistics. 1948-1980.
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.
YEAR
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
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TOTAL VARIABLE INPUT PRICE INDEX: 1948-80
TABLE A. 5
INDEX OF VARIABLE PRICES (1967^100)
73.46
76.56
76.37
81.10
84.70
83.70
83.20
83.50
83.60
86.60 
87.90
89.20 
89.99 
91.00
91.80
93.50
94.20 
97.58
98.40
100 .00
101.60
102.70 
106.10
111.40
115.80 
124.90
159.80
192.20
196.40
205.30
213.30
240.70 
286.00
